Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1997

Josie Ann Gunderson v. The May Department
Stores Company, Payless Shoe Source, Inc. : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Leonard E. McGee; Lehman, Jensen & Donahue; Attorneys for Appellant.
Lynn Davies; Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson; Attorneys for Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Josie Ann Gunderson v. The May Department Stores Company, Payless Shoe Source, Inc., No. 970178 (Utah Court of
Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/752

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

/^>f

(

/O

» ' « " COURT OF APPEALS
BR EF
UTAH
'
DOCUMENT
KFU
50

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JOSIE ANN GUNDERSON,
Case No. 97017!
Category 15
No. 940901812

Appellant,
vs,
THE MAY DEPARTMENT STORES COMPANY,
a New York Corporation and PAYLESS
SHOE SOURCE, INC., a Missouri
Corporation,
Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE LESLIE LEWIS PRESIDING
LEONARD E. McGEE - A2185
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.
Attorneys for Appellant
620 Judge Building
8 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)532-7858

Lynn Davies
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Appellees
P.O. Box 2465
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84110-2465
(801)531-2000

1

1 laws

JUL 1 8 1997
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JOSIE ANN GUNDERSON,
Case No. 97017!
Category 15
No. 940901812

Appellant,
vs.
THE MAY DEPARTMENT STORES COMPANY,
a New York Corporation and PAYLESS
SHOE SOURCE, INC., a Missouri
Corporation,
Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE LESLIE LEWIS PRESIDING
LEONARD E. McGEE - A2185
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C.
Attorneys for Appellant
620 Judge Building
8 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)532-7858

Lynn Davies
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Appellees
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
(801)531-2000

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

2

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

A. Nature of the Case

2

B. Course of the Proceedings

3

C. Disposition in Trail Court

4

D. Statement of Facts

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

10

ARGUMENT

11

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM BRINGING AN ACTION
FOR BAD FAITH AND FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AGAINST HER EMPLOYER BECAUSE
THE UTAH WORKER'S COMPENSATION STATUTE, U.C.A.
§35-1-60, ET SEQ., PROVIDES THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
FOR PLAINTIFF
A. THE UTAH CODE DOES NOT PRECLUDE A CIVIL ACTION
AGAINST A FORMER EMPLOYER
B. FAILURE TO PAY APPELLANT' S BILLS
C. APPELLEES FAILED TO COMPLY WITH ORDERS OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
D. NO UTAH STATUTE PRECLUDES DISTRICT COURT ACTION
BY THE APPELLANT

11

11
11
13
14
17

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF CANNOT MAINTAIN A BAD FAITH CLAIM
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IS
DID NOT SUFFER ACTUAL
DEFENDANTS ACTIONS

IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
BARRED BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF
PHYSICAL INJURY FROM THE
2

CONCLUSION

2

MAILING CERTIFICATE

2

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
A. Cases
Aranda v. Insurance Company of North America, 748 S.W. 2d
550 (Tex. 1988)

15

Coleman v. American Universal Insurance Co., 273 N.W. 2d
220 (Wise. 1979)

15

Gibson v. National Ben Franklin Insurance Co., 387 A.2d 220
(Maine 1978)

13

Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 858 P.2d 970
(Utah 1993)

22

Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236 (Utah 1992) 24,
25, 26
Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, 609 P. 2d 257 (Mont. 1980)
14
Hollman v. Liberty Mutual Insurance, 712 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir.
1983)

13

Izaquirre v. Texas Employees Insurance Association, 749
S.W. 2d 550 (Texas Ct. App. 1988)

15, 16

Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988)

22-23, 24

Kaluza v. Home Insurance Co., 403 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. 1987) 13
Pixton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,
809 P.2d 746, (Utah App. 1991)

19, 22

Savage v. Educator' s Insurance Co., 874 P.2d 130 (Utah App.
1994)

16, 18, 20, 21, 22

iv

Tallman v. Hanssen, 427 N.W. 868 (Iowa 1988)

12

B. Statutes and Other Authorities
U.C.A. §35-1-60 (1953), as amended

12

U.C.A. §35-1-78 (1953), as amended

17

U.C.A. §31A-26-103 (1953), as amended

17

U.C.A. §31A-26-301 (1953), as amended

17

U.C.A. §3lA-26-303 (1953), as amended

18

v

The Appellant, Josie Ann Gunderson, pursuant to Rule 24
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits this
Appeal Brief.
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to
decide this appeal pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(i).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that the plaintiff
is barred from bringing an action for bad faith and for
negligent infliction of emotional distress against her
employer because the Utah Worker's Compensation statute,
U.C.A. §35-1-60, et seq., provides the exclusive remedy for
plaintiff?
2. Did the trial court err in concluding that the plaintiff
cannot maintain a bad faith claim against the defendants?
3. Did the trial court err in concluding that the
plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress was barred because the plaintiff did not suffer
actual physical injury from the Defendants actions?

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The facts set forth in this brief, and as found by the
Court below, are not in dispute.
The trial court's legal conclusions should be given no
deference and should be reviewed for legal correctness.
General Glass Corp. V. Mast Construction Co., 754 P.2d 438
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The following statutory provisions and case law are
determinative of the issues on appeal:
U.C.A. §35-1-60 (1953), as amended;
U.C.A. §35-1-78 (1953), as amended;
U.C.A. §31A-26-301 (1953), as amended;
U.C.A. §31A-26-303 (1953), as amended
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
This is a tort claim, alleging negligent infliction of
emotional distress and violation of public policy as well as
a claim alleging bad faith in the administration of a
worker's compensation insurance claim and breach of
contract.
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This is an appeal from the Orders of the District
Court, entered on May 8, 1996 and January 7, 1997, granting
the Defendant's Summary Judgment and dismissing Appellant's
claims.

The Orders were entered in the Third Judicial

District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Leslie
Lewis, presiding.
B. Course of Proceedings.
The plaintiff filed her complaint in March, 1994.
After due discovery, defendants filed their first Motion for
Summary Judgment on or about October 12, 1995, with oral
argument held on April 9, 1996.

The Court granted

Appellees' Motion with regard to plaintiff's claims for bad
faith, intentional infliction of emotional distress and
violation of public policy, but not with regard to her
claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The

Court below reasoned that appellant had no privity of
contract with the Appellees and, therefore, could not
maintain a cause of action for bad faith.

(R. 314-318)

On November 1, 1996, Appellees filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the remaining claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress.

After hearing on January

7, 1997, the Court granted Appellees motion, holding that

3

appellant's claim for emotional disturbance could not stand
because Utah law regarding a negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim requires a party to be in a "zone
of danger" or be threatened with physical injury, neither of
which was alleged here.

(R. 377-379)

C. Disposition in Trial Court
Honorable Leslie Lewis, Third District Court Judge,
granted partial summary judgment to Appellees on Appellant's
claims of bad faith, violation of public policy and
intentional infliction of emotional distress on April 6,
1996 and granted summary judgment to Appellees on the
Appellant's remaining claim of negligent infliction of
emotional distress on January 7, 1997.
D. Facts
The following facts were not disputed below:
1. Appellees are self-insured for purposes of Worker's
Compensation, pursuant to U.C.A. §35-1-1, et seq. (1953), as
amended. (Plaintiff's Complaint 11;

Record 1-8)

(Hereinafter, the Record on Appeal will be abbreviated as
"R")
2. The Western Region Claims Office of Appellee May
Department Stores, Inc., (hereinafter "May") located in Los
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Angeles, California, administers the worker's compensation
claims for, among other corporations owned by May, Payless
ShoeSource, Inc. (hereinafter "Payless"), a wholly owned
subsidiary of May. (Complaint, 510)(R. 1-8)
3. On or about January 20, 1991, Appellant was brutally
assaulted while employed at a Payless ShoeSource store.
(Complaint, 19) (R.l-8)
4. As a result of injuries sustained in that assault,
Appellant filed a worker's compensation claim with
Appellees. (Complaint, 510)(R. 1-8)
5. Subsequent to the assault, Appellant terminated her
employment with the Appellees.
6. On October 2 and 4, 1991, Enoch Dangerfield, M.D., a
psychiatrist hired by the Appellees, examined the Appellant.
(R. 239-242)
7. In June, 1992, Ralph Gant, Ph.D., a psychologist
treating the Appellant for mental stress and injury as a
result of the assault, concluded that the Appellant had, in
fact, suffered such injury from the assault.

Dr. Gant

relayed his conclusions to the Appellees. (Affidavit of
Ralph Gant, Ph.D., R. 266-268)
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8. The Appellees did not pay Dr. Gant's bills, which
were submitted to the Appellees.

(Affidavit of Ralph Gant,

U8, R. 349)
9. In a letter to the Appellees, dated September 11,
1992, Dr. Dangerfield concluded that the Appellant suffered
mental distress and injury as a result of the assault. (R.
239-242)
10. In March, 1993, David L. McCann, M.D., a second
psychiatrist hired by the Appellee, examined the Appellant
and reached the same conclusions as Dr. Dangerfield.
(Paragraph 11 of Undisputed Facts of Plaintiff's Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; R.
349)
11. The Appellees did not pay Dr. Gant's bills as they
were submitted and, in fact, did not pay those bills until
March 30, 1994, after the complaint was filed by Appellant
in the Third District Court.

(R. 243)

12. On March 17, 1992, James L. Guinn, D.D.S., a
dentist and Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) expert, who had
been hired by the Appellees, examined the Appellant. (R.
244-246)
13. In a letter to Appellees, dated March 23, 1992, Dr.
Guinn states that the Appellant had suffered a TMJ injury as
6

a result of the assault and that she needed surgery to
relieve her symptoms.

In that letter, Dr. Guinn supported

surgery as proposed by Crayton Walker, D.D.S., the
Appellant's treating dentist. (R. 244-246)
14. On April 19, 1993, Dr. Walker, D.D.S., performed
the surgery which Dr. Guinn, Appellees doctor, had stated
needed to be performed on the Appellant.

(R. 259)

15. The Appellee did not pay Dr. Walker's bill until
March 30, 1994, after the complaint was filed by Appellant
in the Third District Court. (R. 247)
16. On June 17, 1993, a medical panel appointed by the
Utah Industrial Commission reviewed the treatment received
by the Appellant and concluded that the Appellee should pay
the Appellant's medical bills. (R. 248-255)
17. Appellees failed to pay the Appellant's medical
bills after the report of the medical panel, even after
demand by the Appellant. (1118 of Undisputed Facts of
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment; R. 224)
18. In January, 1994, a hearing was held before an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the Utah Industrial
Commission.

The ALJ that the Appellee should pay the

Appellant's medical bills and instructed the Appellees
7

attorney to write an order reflecting the ALJ's conclusions.
(1J19 of Undisputed Facts of Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; R. 225)
19. Appellees failed to pay the Appellant's medical
bills even after the ALJ's findings were issued.

(1120 of

Undisputed Facts of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; R. 225)
20. On January 13, 1994, the Order of the Utah
Industrial Commission, which ordered the Appellee to pay the
Appellant's medical bills, and which was written by
attorneys for the Appellees, was signed by the ALJ. (R. 256262)
21. Appellee's still failed to pay the medical bills of
the Appellant's, even after their attorney's wrote the order
which was signed by the ALJ. (H22 of Undisputed Facts of
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment; R. 22 5)
22. Appellees did pay the medical bills of the
Appellant, after the Appellant filed a Complaint in the
Third District Court.

(R. 243-247)

23. Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she
understood that her bills would be paid by worker's
8

compensation. (Deposition of plaintiff, pp. 70-71, Exhibit C
to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment; (R. 206-207)
24.

Appellant's allegation that Appellees acted

negligently with regard to Appellant's credit reputation was
supported by a claim of one incident where she was told that
she had a "blip" on her credit.

Appellant was not aware of

any time where she was actually denied credit. (Deposition
of Plaintiff, pp. 21-23; R. 209-211)
25. Appellant did not return to the Utah Industrial
Commission to seek enforcement of the ALJ's order against
the Appellees. (H13 of Undisputed Facts of Defendant's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; R.
185)
26. On or about May 8, 1996, Judge Leslie A. Lewis of
the Third District Court granted Appellees Motion for
Summary Judgment with regards to Appellants claims for bad
faith, intentional infliction of emotional distress and
violation of public policy, but not with regard to
Appellant's claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress.

The District Court reasoned that Appellant had no

privity of contract with the Appellees and, therefore, could
not maintain a cause of action for bad faith.
9

The District

Court also concluded that there was no cause of action for
violation of public policy in Utah and that the facts did
not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. (R. 314-318)
27. On or about January 7, 1997, Judge Lewis granted
Appellees Motion for Reconsideration and ordered Summary
Judgment against the Appellant, dismissing Appellant's claim
for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The

District Court held that Appellant's claim for emotional
distress could not stand because Utah law requires that a
claimant be in a "zone of danger" or be threatened with
physical injury in order to maintain a cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress.

(R. 377-379)

These facts were undisputed by the parties in the trial
court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
While an employee is precluded from bringing a tort
action against an employer, a former employee is not
precluded from bringing such an action for torts which
occurred after the period of employment.
An employee may bring an action against an employer who
acts as the employer, the worker's compensation insured, the

10

worker's compensation insurer and the worker's compensation
insurance administrator for bad faith and negligent
infliction of emotional distress for the employer/insurer/
insured/administrator's failure to pay worker's compensation
claims on a timely and fair basis.
A plaintiff who makes a claim for negligent infliction
of emotional distress based on psychological injury only
need not be in the "zone of danger" or suffer an actual
physical injury in order to prevail on the claim.
ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM BRINGING AN ACTION
FOR BAD FAITH AND FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AGAINST HER EMPLOYER BECAUSE
THE UTAH WORKER'S COMPENSATION STATUTE, U.C.A.
§35-1-60, ET SEQ., PROVIDES THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
FOR PLAINTIFF.
A. The Utah Code Does Not Preclude a Civil Action
Against a Former Employer.
While the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah
may have exclusive jurisdiction over worker's compensation
claims, once an order of the Commission has been entered,
the Appellant may seek enforcement of that order with the
Utah Industrial Commission or through the District Courts.

11

The Appellee argues that U.C.A. §35-1-60 precludes an
action by an employee against her employer.

However, that

section precludes actions only for injuries "incurred by the
employee in the course of or because of or arising out of
his employment".

In this case, the injury arises out of the

failure of the employer to comply with orders of the
Industrial Commission after the employee was no longer
employed by the Appellee.

This is not an injury "incurred

by the employee in the course of" her employment in this
case.
While it is true that the original injury arose because
the Appellant was attacked by an assailant while she was
working as a clerk for the Appellee, the Appellant's
subsequent mental injury (for which this action is
maintained) arose after the Appellant no longer worked for
the Appellees and was no longer employed by them.

The

Appellant's rationale has been recognized and accepted by
Federal and state courts.

In Tallman v. Hanssen, 427 N.W.

2nd 868 (Iowa 1988), the Iowa Supreme Court wrote that:
It is axiomatic that an employee's rights
and remedies arising from an injury suffered in
the course of employment are exclusively
provided under Iowa Code . . . A district court
ordinarily would have no subject matter
jurisdiction over a claim that an employee is
entitled to worker's compensation benefits.
12

But the exclusivity principle is limited to
matters surrounding a job-related injury and
does not extend to subsequent dealings during
which a tort may arise by reason of bad faith
on the part of an employer's insurer.
Id. at 870 (Emphasis added)
See also Hollman v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 712
F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1983)(statutory language of exclusivity
did not apply to torts which "occur independent of the
industrial injury"); Gibson v. National Ben Franklin Ins.
Co., 387 A.2d 220 (Maine 1978); Kaluza v. Home Insurance
Co., 403 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. 1987.
B. Failure of Appellee to Pay Appellant's Bills
The Appellees seemed to believe below that if they paid
the Appellant's bills, at some time, then the Appellant
would suffer no harm.

There is more to the Appellant's

claim than the street basketball term of "No harm, no foul."
In her complaint the Appellant states:
That by failing to pay the medical bills
of the Appellant as required by the Industrial
Commission of the State of Utah, Appellees knew
or should have known that the Appellant would
receive continued demands for payment of the
bills by her medical providers and that,
thereby, the Appellant would suffer emotional
distress and would be harmed as to her credit
reputation.
Complaint at paragraph 26. (R. 5)
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In his Affidavit, Ralph Gant, Ph.D., the Appellant's
treating psychologist, states that the Appellant told him
that she was experiencing stress and anxiety because she was
anxious about medical bills not being paid and that she was
being "hounded" by medical creditors. (Gant Affidavit at §6;
R. 267)
Additionally, the report from Dr. Dangerfield, dated
September 11, 1992 states that:
She claims that bill collectors have been
calling her -- that there are two unpaid
anesthesiology bills, radiology charges, etc.
She said that one or two of the providers
turned her over to a collector, though others
didn't. She complained bitterly that she has
had to call the credit bureau to clear her
credit reports, etc. (R. 240)
While the Appellant may have understood that her bills
would be, eventually, paid by the Appellee, it does not take
a great leap of the imagination to understand that being
"hounded" by creditors would be mentally stressful and cause
anxiety, even if the bills were, eventually, paid by the
Appellees.
C. Appellees Failed to Comply with Orders of the
Industrial Commission
The Appellees below argued that the Appellant's
recourse upon the Appellees failure to comply with orders of
14

the Utah Industrial Commission, was to go back to the
Commission for an order penalizing the Appellee.

The

Appellees claim that Utah law provides for a fifteen percent
penalty for failure to pay the bills, which should have been
an adequate remedy for the Appellant.

Fortunately for

abused workers, many courts in the United States disagree
with the Appellees.
In Coleman v. American Universal Insurance Co., 273
N.W. 2d 220 (Wise. 1979), the Wisconsin Supreme Court
rejected that same argument made by the Appellees and held
that a bad faith claim could be made against the employer.
The court in Coleman reasoned that the penalty provision
would be applicable to an unexcused delay in payment even if
no bad faith was shown.

See also Aranda v. Insurance Co. of

North America, 748 S.W. 2d 550 (Tex. 1988), Hayes v. Aetna
Fire Underwriters, 609 P.2d 257 (Mont. 1980).

In Izaguirre

v. Texas Employer's Insurance Association, 749 S.W.2d 550
(Texas. Ct. App. 1988), the court stated that:
. . . a special relationship arises out of
the parties' unequal bargaining power and the
nature of the insurance contracts which would
allow unscrupulous insurers to take advantage
of their insured's misfortunes in bargaining
for settlement or resolution of claims.
Id. at 554.
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The Izaguirre court went on to state that the statutory
regulation and existing statutory penalties were not
adequate to equalize bargaining power between workers and
insurers in settling claims and that bad faith claims could
be made against the insurer. Id., at 555.
Even though the above cases deal with bad faith claims
against insurers, which the Utah Supreme Court has
apparently rejected in Savage v. Educator's Insurance Co.,
874 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1994), Section II of this Memorandum
makes clear that the Appellant in this case had a special
contractual relationship with the Appellees as an employee
of the Appellees.
If the Appellees are going to disobey the order of the
Industrial Commission that their very attorney wrote, there
is certainly no guarantee that the Appellees would comply if
faced with only a small fifteen percent increase in the
award to Appellant that Appellees may, someday, pay.

There

must be an effective way for an injured worker to force her
employer to comply with an order of the Industrial
Commission.

One such way is a bad faith action against the

employer, when that employer wears all of the hats of
employer, insurer, insured and administrator, as in this
case.
16

D. No Utah Statute Precludes District Court Action by
the Appellant
The Appellees claim that, because U.C.A. §35-1-78
provides for continuing jurisdiction of the Industrial
Commission over Worker's Compensation matters, that statute
somehow precludes the Appellant from bringing a District
Court action for bad faith against the employer.
However, there is no statute nor any rule of the
Industrial Commission which precludes District Court action.
The Appellees have argued that there is a "simple
solution" of having the Appellant go back to the Industrial
Commission for further orders to pay the Appellant.

That

course of action, however, assumes good faith on the part of
the Appellees, which was clearly not shown by their course
of dealings with the Appellant below.
In any event, U.C.A. §31A-26-103 (1953), as amended,
provides that:
In addition to being subject to this and
other chapters of this title, insurers writing
worker's compensation insurance in this state,
including the Worker's Compensation Fund of
Utah, are subject to the Industrial Commission
with respect to claims for and payment of
compensation and benefits. (Emphasis added).
U.C.A §31A-26-301 (1953), as amended, states:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, an
17

insurer shall timely pay every valid insurance
claim made by an insured . . .
(3) This section applies only to claims made
by claimants in direct privity of contract with
the insurer, (Emphasis added)
U.C.A. §31A-26-303 (1953), as amended, states:
(1) No insurer or person representing an insurer
may engage in any unfair claim settlement practice
. . . (Emphasis added)

Through the provisions of U.C.A. §§31A-26-301 and 31A26-303 (1953), as amended, worker's compensation insurers
(or self-insurers, such as the Appellees) are subject to bad
faith claims for unfair claim settlement practices.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF CANNOT MAINTAIN A BAD FAITH CLAIM
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS.
In the District Court below, the Appellees relied upon
Savage v. Educator's Insurance Company, 874 P.2d 130 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994).

However that reliance is misplaced and is

based on a misreading of this Courts holding in Savage.
In Savage, the employer, the Jordan School District,
was self-insured for its worker's compensation insurance.
The District contracted with Educator's Mutual to administer
the District's worker's compensation insurance policy.
at 130.
18

Id.

In Savage, the Appellant was injured while on the job
with the school district.

Because of an alleged failure by

Educator's to pay medical bills incurred as a result of that
injury, Savage filed a complaint against Educator's alleging
lack of good faith and fair dealing, later amending the
complaint to include breach of contract, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, etc.

Those claims fairly

mirror the claims made by the Appellant in this instant
case.
Educator's filed a motion to dismiss Savage's claim,
basing their argument on the premise that Savage was not in
privity of contract with Educator's.

The Court of Appeals

agreed that Savage was not in privity of contract with
Educator's (the insurance administrator) and dismissed her
claims.
The Appellee here argues that an injured party has no
right to bring an action against an insurance company for
lack of good faith and fair dealing where is no contractual
relationship between the injured party and the insurance
company.

Pixton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

Company, 800 P.2d 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

19

However, this case differs significantly from both
Savage and Pixton in that, in this case, the Appellant is_ in
privity of contract with the Appellee.
Appellee admits below in their statement of facts in
their Memorandum in Support of Partial Summary Judgment. (§3
of Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment; R. 184)
Additionally, the Appellee here acts as its own
insurance administrator.

Unlike the Appellee insurance

administrator in Savage, which was a third-party entity, the
Appellee here is the insured, the insurer, the insurance
administrator and the employer of the Appellant.

As an

employee of the Appellee, the Appellant has privity of
contract through that relationship.
In apparently placing its reliance on footnote 1 of
Savage, Appellee misreads that footnote.

That footnote

states:
As Educators correctly points out, the
District is self-insured. Educator's contract with
the District is to administer the District's worker's
compensation claims rather than to provide the
insurance. This departure from the typical employer/
insurer relationship does not affect our holding today
because in either situation the subject contract is
between the employer and the insurance company.
Id. at 131. (Emphasis added)

20

First, there is no "contract" between the Appellee and
itself in this case.

The only contract in this case is an

implied employment contract between the Appellant and the
Appellees.
Second, unlike Educator ! s and the school district in
Savage, nowhere does either Appellee in this case argue that
it is merely an administrator of the other's self-insured
worker's compensation plan.

In fact, in paragraph 8 of its

Answer to the Appellant's Complaint, the Appellees state
that they:
. . . admit that these answering
Appellees provided their own worker's
compensation claims coverage and claims
processing . . . (Emphasis added). (R. 18)
The Appellees in this case admit that they:
1) Are self-insured for worker's compensation
purposes;
2) Provide their own claims processing;
3) That Appellee Payless is a subsidiary of
Appellee May.
4) That Appellant is an employee of the Appellee.
In this case the employer

(May Department Stores and

Payless Shoe Stores), the insurance company

(also May

Department Stores and Payless Shoe Stores) and the insurance
administrator

(also May Department Stores and Payless Shoe
21

Stores) are the same entity.
Unlike the defendant's in Savage, in this case the
Appellant's wear all of the hats of employer, insurer,
insured and administrator.
Savage and Pixton are distinguishable from the facts
present in this case.
Ill
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IS BARRED BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF
DID NOT SUFFER ACTUAL PHYSICAL INJURY FROM THE
DEFENDANTS ACTIONS.
The Utah Supreme Court in Hansen v. Mountain Fuel
Supply Co. 858 P.2d 970, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 54 (Utah 1993),
examined the issue of whether or not a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress could be claimed absent a
physical injury.

After reviewing its decision in Johnson v.

Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988), the court held that a
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress may be
maintained for mental injury only.
Although many courts agree that a
Appellant must establish some accompanying
physical manifestation in order to recover for
NIED [negligent infliction of emotional
distress], they differ widely regarding the
nature of evidence sufficient to establish such
harm. See, e.g., DeStories v. City of Phoenix,
744 P.2d 705, 710 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)
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(defining standard for injury as "physical harm
or medically identifiable effect"); Cathcart v.
Keene Indus. Insulation, 324 Pa. Super. 123,
471 A.2d 493, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (same);
Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d
431, 434 (Tenn. 1982) (recognizing ingestion of
frightening or noxious substance as sufficient
physical injury). The language used in section
313 of the Restatement provides some guidance.
Subsection (1) allows recovery for "illness or
bodily harm." Restatement (Second) of Torts §
313(1) (1965) (emphasis added). The drafters'
use of "or" rather than "and" shows an
intention to allow a Appellant to recover not
only where bodily harm results from emotional
trauma, but where "illness" results as well.
"Illness" is "an unhealthy condition of body or
mind." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 56 6
(1981). From this we conclude that either
physical or mental illness may support the NIED
cause of action.
A rule allowing recovery for mental
illness as well as physical injury serves a
major purpose of the injury requirement -ensuring genuineness of claims. Given recent
medical advances in the fields of psychiatry
and psychology, it is now possible to establish
emotional illness with some degree of
certainty. See Terry M. Dworkin, Fear of
Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A
Solution or a Pandora's Box? 53 Fordham L. Rev.
527, 532-33 (1984). A Appellant who can
establish through appropriate expert testimony
that he or she suffers from mental illness as a
result of a Appellees negligent conduct may
maintain an action for NIED.
We emphasize, however, that the emotional
distress suffered must be severe; it must be
such that "a reasonable [person,] normally
constituted, would be unable to adequately cope
with the mental stress engendered by the
circumstances of the case." Rodrigues v. State,
472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970)
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Id, at 973. (Emphasis added)
Under the rule outlined in Hansen, it is not necessary
for the xAppellant to be a "zone of danger" for physical harm
in order to maintain a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress based purely on mental injury.

It is

enough for the Appellant to suffer purely from mental
injury. As the affidavit of Ralph Gant, Ph.D., the
Appellant's treating psychologist states, the Appellant has
certainly suffered mental injury at the hands of these
Appellees. (R. 266-268).
In the earlier case of Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, 830
P.2d 236 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court examined a case
where four people received an electrical shock while boating
at Lake Powell.

The plaintiff claimed to have sustained

psychological injury from fear when she witnessed harm to
her son who had, along with three others, received an
electrical shock.

The plaintiff had, herself, not been in

the water nor had she received an electrical shock or other
physical injury.

The defendants moved for summary judgment

on the grounds that the plaintiff had not been in danger of
drowning or receiving an electrical shock nor did she fear
at the time that she would drown or receive an electrical
shock.

Plaintiff claimed that the facts of the case, and
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her claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress,
brought her within the ambit of section 313 of the
Restatement of Torts 2d.
In Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, supra, the Utah Supreme
Court again discussed Judge Durham's opinion m

Jonnson v.

Rogers, supra, the seminal case discussing the theory of
"zone of danger" and negligent infliction of emotional
distress.

The Court also discussed the application of

section 313 of the Restatement of Torts 2d.
The Court m

Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats stated:

Negligent infliction of injury occurs when a
person breaches a duty of care that he or she owes to
other persons. Those persons within the scope or
"zone" of the defendant's duty are classed as "victims"
of an accident, whether or not they incur injuries
themselves. "Bystanders" are those persons outside the
scope of the defendant's duty of care who may witness
or be affected by the accident which as resulted from
the breach. In Johnson, a majority of this court
adopted the "zone of danger" theory of recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. This
theory, found m section 313 of the Restatement, allows
recovery only for those who are "victims" of another's
breach of duty. (Emphasis added)
Id. at 239.
The Court went on the discuss how section 313 and the
"zone of danger" theory plays out with regard to a plaintiff
who is not physically injured during an occurrence.
Subsection (1) of section 313 imposes
liability on a defendant who causes emotional distress
if the defendant knows that his or her conduct involved
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an unreasonable risk of emotional distress "otherwise
than by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third
person."

Subsection (2) of section 313 is clear in its
requirement that those seeking to recover for emotional
distress caused by witnessing injury to others much be
within the zone of danger created by the defendant's
breach of duty.

A reading of the two subsections in section
313 shows that the subsections contain the requirement
that a plaintiff be within the zone of danger to
recover for emotional distress caused by an accident if
the plaintiff is not physically injured in the
accident. (Emphasis added)
Id. At 240.
So, m

this case, the question to be answered is:

1) Did the Appellees owe a duty of care to the
Appellant?
If the Appellees owed a duty of care to the Appellant
in this case, then she was within the "zone of danger", and
was a "victim" of the Appellee's negligence (as it may be
proved to the trier of fact), as outlined by the Utah
Supreme Court in Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats and no physical
harm is required.

Apparently a fear is safety is not required either.
(2) of section 313 of the Restatement of Torts states:
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Comment on Subsection

In any event, the p l a i n t i f f has manifested physical
symptoms of her injury in the form of panic attacks and the
continued need for p s y c h i a t r i c care and the administration
of psychotropic medication.
Also, the Appellees argument below ignores the very
r e a l injury t h a t occurs to one who has incurred emotional
distress.

The Appellees would have the court ignore r e a l

injury t h a t occurs with emotional d i s t r e s s and require t h a t
a physical injury be present - even when the physical injury
would be, of i t s e l f , inconsequential. In other words, the
Appellees argument would allow a defendant to n e g l i g e n t l y
t r e a t i n d i v i d u a l s in any fashion t h a t they wanted to as long
as the defendant did not a c t u a l l y p h y s i c a l l y injure the
individual.
To deny the Appellant the r i g h t to bring a claim for
negligent i n f l i c t i o n of emotional d i s t r e s s for a mental
injury on the grounds t h a t she did not suffer a concurrent
physical injury would allow a defendant to i n f l i c t a wide

d. The r u l e s t a t e d i n Subsection (1) a p p l i e s only where t h e
n e g l i g e n t conduct of t h e a c t o r t h r e a t e n s t h e o t h e r with emotional
d i s t r e s s l i k e l y t o r e s u l t i n b o d i l y harm because of t h e o t h e r ' s
f r i g h t , shock, or o t h e r emotional d i s t u r b a n c e , a r i s i n g out of fear
for h i s own s a f e t y , or t h e i n v a s i o n of h i s own i n t e r e s t s .
(Emphasis added)
Here, t h e d e f e n d a n t s have invaded an i n t e r e s t
then p u t t i n g her i n f e a r of her own s a f e t y .
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of t h e p l a i n t i f f ,

other

range of very real injury on plaintiffs without allowing the
injured party any recourse.
To make such a ruling would deny the existence of very
real psychological and emotional abuses which occur daily in
our society.
CONCLUSION
The Worker's Compensation act does not provide an
exclusive remedy for injuries suffered by a worker outside
of the employment relationship, or injuries which occur as a
result of bad faith on the part of the employer in
administering worker's compensation insurance.
Appellant, through her employment relationship with the
Appellees, had the necessary privity of contract in order to
bring a bad faith action.

In this case, the Appellees wore

all of the hats of employer/insurer/insured/administrator.
All of the necessary elements of negligent infliction
of emotional distress exist in this case, and the Utah
Supreme Court has recognized such an action for mental
injury alone in Hansen.
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